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RECENT DECISIONS
The scope of this last section of I. T. 3795 was severely re-
stricted in a subsequent case where the taxpaper purchased stock
options from his employer corporation and later sold them at a
profit. The Tax Court, relying on the dictum in the Smith case,
held that the spread between the sale and purchase price of the
options was not ordinary income and that I. T. 3795 did not
apply. Lauson Stone, 19 T. C. 872 (1953), aff'd, 210 F. 2d 33
(1954).
Although in the instant case the employee exercised, rather
than sold the options, which he received in connection with an em-
ployment contract rather than by purchase, the court reached the
same result as in the Stone case, supra. The court here relies
heavily on the manifest intent of the corporation that the option
be considered compensation for the year in which it was granted,
and the finding that the option could have been sold for a substan-
tial sum in the year of its receipt.
By holding that, despite the subsequent exercise, the value
of the option at the time of grant was the only compensation in-
volved, the McNamara case has now completely vitiated I. T. 3795,
supra, and its rigid objective criteria.
Since the court did find that the grant of the option was in-
tended to be compensation, T. D. 5507 is not yet squarely contro-
verted if the option, rather than the stock purchased pursuant to
it be considered the "property transferred." However, there
seems to be little doubt that the courts have not departed from
their position that what is compensation under the code is deter-
mined by the action and intention of the parties and not by Treas-
ury Regulations. Jues Gordon
LNT ERPLEADER- TEST OF MUTUALLY
EXCLUSIVE CLAIMS
A and B are brokers. In an action by A to recover commis-
sions from vendor, B was interpleaded. In the contract of sale
between vendor and purchaser, the latter designated B as procur-
ing broker and agreed to deliver to vendor an agreement in-
demnifying him against loss by reason of any claim by any other
broker for commissions. Simultaneously, another agreement was
made between vendor and B reciting the contents of the above
contract and stating that vendor was to pay $90,000 to B. Held
(4-1): B can rest on his agreement with vendor; A's claim for com-
missions earned is not affected thereby; therefore, interpleader
should not have been granted. Norman v. Oakland Golf Club, 282
App. Div. 960, 125 N. Y. S. 2d 859 (2d Dep't 1953).
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Interpleader allows a party to avoid the risk of being vexed
by two or more suits in respect to one liability. 4 PomERoY's
EQUITY JuRIsPRu DEcE § 1320 (5th ed. Symons 1941). Modern
statutes have enabled courts of law to grant this relief which had
its origin in the common law and was expanded in equity. Rogers,
Historical Origins of Interpleader, 51 Yale L. J. 924 (1942); C. P.
A. §§ 285-287. Interpleader statutes in New York include both
an action of interpleader, 0. P. A. § 285, and interpleader in
a pending action, 0. P. A. §287. However, unless stating so,
the statutory remedy does not in itself shed the effect of the
original doctrines of interpleader. POMEROY, supra, § 1329;
Pouch v. Prudential Ins. Co., 204 N. Y. 281, 97 N. E. 731(1912). Such doctrines have dealt primarily with: (1) disin-
terest, e. g. that the person asking the relief neither have nor claim
any interest in the subject matter; (2) no independent liability,
e. g., that such person stand perfectly indifferent between both
claimants as a mere stakeholder; (3) identity, e. g. that the claim
be for the same thing; and (4) privity, e. g. that all claims be de-
rived from a common source. PoMERoY, supra, § 1322; See also
Frumer, On Revising the New York Interpleader Statutes, 25
N. Y. U. L. J. 737 (1950).
The requirement of "disinterest" has been eliminated in New
York by statute as to interpleader in a pending action. C. P. A.
§ 287. "It probably can be said that the requirement of 'no in-
dependent liability' has been eliminated by statute to the same
extent as that of 'disinterest,' " Furmer, supra, at 764, citing
Faning v. Supreme Council, 61 App. Div. 190, 70 N. Y. Supp. 437
(1st Dep't 1901); The "identity" requirement has not been
strictly adhered to in New York. Dorn v. Fox, 61 N. Y. 264 (1874) ;
"It has been pointed out that the 'identity' requirement is partly
an unsuccessful attempt to phrase the principle of 'mutual ex-
clusiveness,' " Frumer, supra at 751; 0hafee, Modernizing Inter-
pleader, 30 YAim L. J. 814 (1921); Clark v. Childs, 234 App. Div.
561, 256 N. Y. Supp. 69 (4th Dep't 1932). Some courts have denied
interpleader if a stakeholder has a separate contract with each
claimant, since no "privity" is said to exist between the claims.
McCreery v. Inge, 49 App. Div. 133, 63 N. Y. Supp. 158 (1st Dep't
1900). However, the privity theory is perhaps giving way to
broader, more liberal rules of modern practice, the trend appar-
ently being to ignore the requirement or hold it inapplicable.
Frumer, supra; Dardonville v. Smith, 133 App. Div. 234, 117 N. Y.
Supp. 216 (2d Dep't 1909), overruling McCreery v. Inge, supra.
As a result of the development of the law indicated above, the
primary test in New York now appears to be that of mutually
exclusive claims. This is illustrated in Clark v. Childs, supra,
where the court, denying interpleader, mentioned that the validity
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of one claim did not depend on the invalidity of the other claim
and said, ". . . in every case of interpleader, whether by action
or by motion, a prerequisite is that . . . the claims must be mu-
tually exclusive." Clark v. Childs, swpra at 561, 256 N. Y. Supp.
at 70. Further indications are seen in the following cases where
interpleader was allowed. Rasines v. Imes, 85 App. Div. 483, 83
N. Y. Supp. 228 (1st Dep't 1903), defendant owed but one amount;
Trembley v. Marshall, 118 App. Div. 839, 103 N. Y. Supp. 680
(1907) (1st Dep't 1907), defendant had not rendered himself
liable to pay double commissions; Dardonville v. Smith, supra,
liability was to one only; Fox v. Comrneyer, 93 Misc. 180, 156 N. Y.
Supp. 1046 (1st Dep't 1916), no conduct resulted in liability for
commissions to both brokers; Myers v. Batcheller, 177 App. Div.
47, 163 N. Y. Supp. 88 (3rd Dep't 1917), the facts allow but one
recovery against defendant; Salaron v. Brooklyn Savings Bank,
180 Misc. 841, 44 N. Y. S. 2d 420 (Sup. Ct. 1943), no special con-
tract gave more than one the right to the commission; Fanslow v.
Manufacturers Trust Co., 181 M'isc. 272, 47 N. Y. S. 2d 396 (Sup.
Ct. 1943), defendant would ultimately be liable for only one com-
mission. This same test led to a denial of interpleader in these
cases: Wood, Dolson Co., Inc. v. Leonett Realty Co., Inc., 227
App. Div. 552, 238 N. Y. Supp. 342 (1st Dep't 1930), one broker
based his claim upon producing a purchaser, and the other claimed
by reason of closing title; Strauss v. Grande Maison de Blanc, 237
App. Div. 83, 260 N. Y. Supp. 368 (1st Dep't 1932), since each
claimant had a separate agreement, each might recover upon his
respective claim, the so-called debts not being mutually exclusive.
In its memorandum the court in the instant case does not
openly avow to a definite principle. However, Williamsburgh
Savings Bank v. Avery, 260 App. Div. 1047, 24 N. Y. S. 2d 367 (2nd
Dep't 1940), a case with similar facts, is cited as not controlling,
because in that case "the insert signed by the broker was, so far
as the broker was concerned, specifically stated to be but a mem-
orial of the original employment of the broker. It was not a new
agreement supported by a new consideration moving to the seller."
Norman v. Oakland Golf Club, supra at 961, 125 N. Y. S. 2d at
860. This would imply the instant case followed the dissent in the
Williamsburgh case, supra at 1047, 24 N. Y. S. 2d at 368, where
two justices expressed the view that since the vendor had de-
termined for itself, by stipulation, that it was liable to one broker,
it could possibly be liable to both. Therefore, the vendor was not
rightly seeking to avoid a double payment, because, there, it could
not be said only one payment was due.
The court's construction of the facts in the Norman case,
resulted in a decision in accord with the test of mutually exclu-
sive claims. However, a court might properly construe the same
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facts to mean that the contract by which vendor agreed to pay$90,000 to B was made for B being the procuring cause of the sale
and not in consideration of the indemnity agreement. Adopting
this interpretation, which allows substance to prevail over forn,the claims of both A and B would then be based purely on com-
missions earned; they would be mutually exclusive; interpleader
could be allowed. See dissent, Norman v. Oakland Golf Club,
supra at 961, 125 N. Y. S. 2d at 861.
Donald J. Holzman
LABOR LAW- STATE JURISDJCTION PREEMPTED
In order to induce an interstate trucker's employees to joinit, defendant union posted pickets at petitioner's loading platform,
though there was no labor dispute or strike in progress. Pefi-
tioner, whose business fell off by as much as 95% as a result of the
refusal of other unionized carriers to cross the line, obtained aninjunction under state law prohibiting such picketing. Held,
unanimously affirming the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's vacat-ing of the injunction, jurisdiction of such practices is vested ex-
clusively in the National Labor Relations Board. Garner v. Team-
sters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 776 (A. F. L.),
74 Sup. Ct. 161 (1953).
The instant decision is another in a long line of cases whichhas taken up the task of defining the respective areas of state andfederal jurisdiction in the field of concerted labor activities, be-ginning with the proposition that where "federal administrationhas made comprehensive regulations effectively governing the sub-ject matter of the statute, . . . state regulation in the field of the
statute is invalid even though that particular phase of the subjecthas not been taken up by the federal agency." Bethlehem SteelCo. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U. S. 767 (1947).As to certain areas of labor relations, federal action is in terms
exclusive; e. g., representation proceedings, 29 U. S. C. A. § 159.In others, state action is in terms permitted; e. g., union shop
agreements, 29 U. S. C. A. § 164(b). Problems arise in that area
where federal law has not completely occupied the field.
The wholesale extension of federal power over the field of
union unfair labor practices, an area which, prior to the enact-
ment of the Taft-Hartley Act, was solely a state concern, has re-
sulted in a considerable amount of litigation. States may notpromulgate a policy contrary to that of the federal act, Inter-
national Union, U. A. W. A., C. I. 0. v. O'Brien, 339 U. S. 454(1950), even in the exercise of their police powers, Amalgamated
Ass'n of Street, Electrical Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Wis-
consin Employment Relations Board, 340 U. S. 383 (1951). On the
